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RECENT DECISIONS
the scope of the Act." The discharge of the strikers does not termi-
nate the relationship of employer and employee, for under the Act a
striking employee does not lose the identification of employee.9 This
relationship between the company and the striking employees has not
been so completely terminated as to have no further connection with
the company's business or the commerce in which it is engaged. 10
The mere fact that the labor dispute"' had commenced prior to the
passage of the Act does not withdraw the parties or the dispute from
the regulatory power of Congress as to the acts subsequently occur-
ring.12 This is not unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law
because of refusal to employers of the right to hire and discharge em-
ployees at will. 13 It is clear that the restriction on the employer's
rights, which is contained in the Statute, although curtailing his un-
restricted use of the right to hire and fire, is directed merely at its
abuse for the purpose of interfering with union activities.' 4
J. J. S.
LABOR - NoRRis-LAGuARDIA ACT - FEDERAL JURISDICTION -
APPLICATION OF THE Ac.-The defendant corporation operating
stores in the District of Columbia employs both white and colored
persons. The petitioner, a corporation composed of colored persons,
in an effort to force the defendant to adopt a policy of employing negro
clerks in certain of its stores caused a member of the alliance to picket
one of the defendant's stores. There existed no employer-employee
'49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (7) (Supp. 1935): "The term 'affecting
commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce, or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
0 49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3) (Supp. 1935): "The term
'employee' * * * shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment."
" Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. N. L. R. B., 302 U. S. 731, 58 Sup. Ct.
55 (1937).
"49 STAT. 499, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp. 1935): "The term 'labor
dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in nego-
tiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
"The court was of the opinion that the act defined its retroactive intention,
but in rendering its decision confined itself to acts committed by the defendant
subsequent to the effectiveness of the act. Instant case at 145.
"N. L. R. B. v. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., 85 F. (2d)
990 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), cert. granted, 299 U. S. 533, 57 Sup. Ct. 112 (1936),
aff'd, 301 U. S. 142, 57 Sup. Ct. 648 (1937).
"Legis. (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1098, 1123.
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relationship between the defendant and the petitioner. The picketing
was done in an orderly, peaceful and legal manner.
The lower courts granted injunctive relief, holding the suit was
not within the statute precluding the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes, as the instant controversy was racial in nature. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, held, reversed. The dispute comes squarely
within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act notwithstanding the
racial nature of the controversy. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., Inc., - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938).
The instant case though factually novel to the U. S. Supreme
Court 1 presented the common problems of determining, first, federal
court jurisdiction in the issuance of anti-labor injunctions, and second,
whether the facts presented constituted a labor dispute within the
terms of the Act.
2
The Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 in fact an extension of the prohibi-
tions contained in Section 20 of the Clayton Act,4 was passed with a
view toward the greater protection of labor from the abuses of unre-
strained issuance of injunctions.5 Its passage limited the federal
courts' injunctive power to exceptional instances, 6 and then only after
a hearing in open court. Senator Norris aptly described the effect of
the Act on federal injunctive power when he said, "* * * this bill does
not prevent the court from restraining any unlawful act * * *. It does
not attempt to take away from federal courts all power to restrain
fraud or violence in labor disputes." 7 It is evident from the terms of
1 The instant case is the only case on the point decided by the U. S.
Supreme Court.
247 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113c (1934) defines a labor dispute
as "any controversy concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or con-
ditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee".
'47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1934).
'38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. §52 (1934) ; see instant case, p. 707;
Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1932) 16 MINr. L. REv. 645-647.
'Norris-LaGuardia type anti-labor injunction legislation has demonstrated
its effectiveness. It is estimated that the New York Act reduced the number
of labor injunctions issued by the courts from an average of 100 a year during
depression years to ten during the first year the statute (N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT§ 876-a) was in effect. Note (1937) 45 YALE L. J. 1064.
'Instances in which the Court will grant injunctions are enumerated in the
Act, 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 107 (1934) ; "The exception was, as
stated in the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee in cases where such
action is imperatively demanded; and yet injunctive relief is often the only
adequate and effective remedy against many irreparable injuries in controversies
of infinite varieties." Oberman & Co., Inc. v. United Garment Workers of
America, 21 F. Supp. 20, 24 (D. C. Mo. 1937).
TExcerpt from Senator Norris' speech before the House; cited in United
Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1, 8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert.
denied, 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590 (1936). Accord: "The act is not intended
to deprive Federal Courts of jurisdiction to restrain if necessary picketing of
coercive or intimidating nature." Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp.
332, 339 (D. C. Ill. 1934).
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the Acts and decisions dealing with the point that the restrictions
placed upon federal courts apply only to cases where the controversy
is being carried on by legal means. Decisions 9 indicating, that picket-
ing, if peaceful, is not violative of the federal or state statute,10 leave
no doubt that the court in the instant case was restricted from issuing
an injunction, providing it found that the facts presented constituted a
labor dispute."
The determination of what constitutes a labor dispute 12 presents
a difficult and unsettled problem, the answer to which lies chiefly in
the courts' interpretation of the phrases, "involving or growing out
of a labor dispute" 23 and "parties participating or interested in a labor
dispute." ' 4  An example of the existing uncertainty is apparent in
decisions dealing with the relation the parties must bear each other
before the controversy can be considered a labor dispute. Despite
statutory language to the effect that the proximate relation of
employer-employee need not exist,15 there has been a diversity of opin-
ion in cases dealing with the point.16 In view of the wording of the
statute cases holding that the relationship must exist cannot be justi-
fied, but they may be explained as the continuing influence of the
Clayton Act.'
7
The application of the Act does not depend upon the motives or
847 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 104 (1934).
'Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 467, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937).
" N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §876-a is similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
For discussion of Civ. PRAc. Acr § 876-a see (1938) 12 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 358.
' It has been held that even peaceful picketing in the absence of a labor
dispute will be enjoined. See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,
245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
""What Is a Labor Dispute", N. Y. L. J., Jan. 10, 11, 1938; (1937) YALE
L. J. 1064; (1938) 5 IxD. L. J. 516; (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 1295.
"47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113 (1934) provides "a case shall
be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons
who are engaged in the same industry, trade craft or occupation, or have
direct or indirect interests therein; * * * or when the case involves any con-
flicting or competing interests in a labor dispute, of persons participating or
interested therein".
1447 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113b (1934) characterizes a person
or association as participating in a labor dispute "if relief is sought against him
or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation
in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein or is a
member, officer or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of
employers or employees engaged in such industry, craft, trade or occupation".
"47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113c (1934).
" Cases holding that the direct relationship of employer-employee must
exist in order to constitute a labor dispute: United Electric Coal Companies
v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup.
Ct. 590 (1936) : Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Union, 184 Wash. 332, 51
P. (2d) 372 (1935). Contra: Grace Co. v. Williams et a., 20 F. Supp. 263 (D.
C. Mo. 1937); American Furniture Co. v. Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 200,
222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1936).
'Under the Clayton Act the courts held that the relationship of employer-
employee was essential to a labor dispute. Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
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background of the dispute.18 It is sufficient in order to deny equitable
relief that the party interested in the controversy bring the case within
the elastic definitions 19 contained in the Act. It is generally conceded
by the courts that the Act bears broad and liberal interpretation.
20
It was evidently with this view in mind that the court in the instant
case arrived at the conclusion that the facts presented constituted a
labor dispute.21
The instant case is opposed to A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. John-
son,2 2 a New York case involving similar facts.23  The court in the
A. S. Beck case, however, decided that the dispute was a racial con-
troversy, which unless enjoined might prove dangerous in that race
riots and race reprisals might occur as a result. Shortly after thi
decision, however, the New York Legislature enacted Section 876-a
of the Civil Practice Act,2 4 which defines a labor dispute in terms sub-
stantially the same as those used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In
view of this subsequent enactment, the New York courts, if called
upon to decide a case factually similar to the instant case, would, in
the opinion of the writer, follow the decision handed down in the in-
Instant case at 707.
"It is clear that the Act was purposely phrased in general terms in an
effort to evade the narrow interpretation placed upon Section 20 of the Clayton
Act by the courts. It was evidently the intention of the legislators to allow
the court wide discretion in its determination of what constituted a labor
dispute, leaving it free to decide the issue by a consideration of the facts pre-
sented, rather than by a fixed formula.
' United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th,
1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup. Ct. 590 (1936).
' It has been generally held that a controversy, in order to constitute a
labor dispute, must be one concerning the terms or conditions of employment.
Diamond Full Fashion Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al., 20 F. Supp. 467 (D. C.
Pa. 1937).
In the instant case, the Court, however, expanded this view to include those
controversies which arise with respect to discrimination in terms or conditions
of employment based on differences of race and color. In view of the fact that
all labor legislation is essentially social, having for its purpose the economic
and social advancement of society in general without regard for race or color,
the decision seems just and in keeping with the undoubtedly intended spirit of
the Act.
135 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1934); for discussion of case see
(1935) 48 HARV. L. Rav. 691; (1935) 83 PA. L. Rav. 381; for a case involving
a similar situation see Green et al. v. Samuelson et al., 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl.
109 (1934).
' The A. S. Beck case, 135 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1934) involved
a Negro association which in an attempt to force the A. S. Beck Corp. to
employ Negro help, picketed one of the plaintiff's stores.
" The N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 876-a, passed in 1935, defines a labor dispute
as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concern-
ing the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain-
ing, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment or con-
cerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising out of the
respective interests of employer and employee regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee."
[ VOL. 13
RECENT DECISIONS
stant case. This result seems logical, for the Legislature in enacting
Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act has in effect declared the policy
of New York, in respect to labor disputes, to be similar to that of the
federal courts.
W. F. P.
LABOR LAw-JuRIsDmcTIoN oF N. L. R. B.-INTESTATE COM-
MERCE.-Petitioner was engaged at its plant at Oakland, California,
in canning, packing and shipping fruit and vegetables, the bulk of
which were grown in California. Interstate and foreign sales approx-
imated one-third of the total sales, and were shipped either f.o.b. or
c.i.f. San Francisco. Many of the permanent warehousemen in peti-
tioner's employ were prevented from entering the plant after attend-
ing a union meeting. A picket line then formed, and was maintained
with such effectiveness that interstate and export shipments virtually
ceased. The National Labor Relations Board found that petitioner
had violated the National Labor Relations Act 1 by engaging in un-
fair labor practices 2 which had led, and tended to lead, to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce. The Board ordered peti-
tioner to desist from such practices and to reinstate with back pay
certain employees who had been discharged. 3 Upon petition of the
Board, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order. 4 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The Board has
jurisdiction inasmuch as the effect of petitioner's activities was to ob-
struct interstate and foreign commerce. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. -, 58 Sup.
Ct. 656 (1938).
The subject of federal control is commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states.5 Sales to purchasers in another state
are not withdrawn from federal control because the goods are delivered
f.o.b. at stated points within the state of origin.6 Therefore petitioner
149 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1937); Legis.(1936) 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 359.
249 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §157 (Supp. 1937) (Labor is
recognized to have the right to organize); 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.
S. C. A. § 158 (Supp. 1937) (Employers are forbidden to interfere with labor's
rights. Such interference is termed an unfair labor practice).
I N. L. R. B. 454 (1936).
'91 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, subd. 3, "Congress shall have power * * * to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states **3 Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. 715 (1912) ; Texas & N. 0.
R. R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227-U. S. 111, 33 Sup. Ct. 229 (1913) ; "* * * the
arrangements that are made between the seller and purchaser with respect to
the place of taking title to the commodity, or as to the payment of freight
where the actual movement is interstate, does not affect either the power of
Congress or the jurisdiction of the Commission which Congress has established."
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